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Abstract—Embedded IoT networks are the backbone of safety-
critical systems like smart factories, autonomous vehicles, and
airplanes. Therefore, their resilience against failures and attacks
should be a prior concern. The design of more capable IoT
devices enables the flexible deployment of network services by
virtualization but it also increases the complexity of the systems
and makes them more error-prone. In this paper, we discuss the
issues and challenges to ensure resilience in virtualized embedded
IoT networks by presenting proactive and reactive measures.
Index Terms—embedded systems, IoT, resilience, virtualized
I. INTRODUCTION
Embedded systems as used in autonomous vehicles, air-
planes, and industrial networks have become complex ecosys-
tems. For instance, the latest Tesla autopilot is supported
by eight cameras and twelve ultrasonic sensors. Similarly,
with Industry 4.0 intelligent cyber-physical systems emerge
that are composed of a multitude of collaborating embedded
devices hosting mission-critical services. We currently observe
that trends from conventional computer networks, like more
powerful devices and virtualization, are widely adopted in
the (embedded) IoT domain [1]. As a result, these systems
can take over more complex tasks and can operate multiple
virtualized services on top of a physical node. It provides
significant flexibility to deploy and migrate IoT services over
the network. For example, an automatic braking system in
an autonomous car can be designed as a chain of services
as shown in Fig. 1. First, a group of sensor-connected image
processing nodes detects objects on the road (as a service).
Second, another group of nodes can initiate an automatic
emergency braking based on the information received from
the first group. The same functionality, e.g., image process-
ing, can be migrated to other candidate nodes when using
virtualization. However, it also increases the complexity of
the systems, making them more error-prone and vulnerable.
Especially safety-critical embedded systems should be resilient
as much as possible against network failures and targeted
attacks. Resilience can bridge the safety and security domains
to maintain a system’s correct services in case of failures and
attacks, to provide graceful degradation in worst-case, and
to recover to a normal system state [2]. The contribution of
this paper is the discussion of issues and challenges for (i)
the design of such a heterogeneous embedded IoT network
without compromising neither service quality nor resilience
and (ii) the active protection of that via required mechanisms
against failures and attacks. In the rest of the paper, we discuss
the issues of the proactive and reactive measures to design and
maintain a resilient embedded IoT network in Sections II and
III, respectively.
Fig. 1. Different services, e.g., cameras, image processing, and automatic
breaking, can be activated on some embedded units (black nodes) and
migrated to the others (white nodes) in case of failures.
II. ISSUES OF PROACTIVE MEASURES
Proactive measures are considered through the design stage
to increase (or guarantee) service availability. Adding re-
silience by redundancy e.g., hot/cold backups and design
diversity, is usually considered in safety-critical systems so
far. However, their implementation, management, and synchro-
nization induce extra burden. Moreover, they can maintain the
availability of a system only in the presence of specific threats
like Byzantine failures. Therefore, further proactive measures
should be considered as discussed in the following.
Time-sensitive nature of services. Missing a deadline in a
time-sensitive service is considered as a failure with potentially
devastating impact. The deployment and provision of services
and redundant resources should be accordingly designed to
fulfill the deterministic communication requirements. Due to
such requirements, it is not sufficient to guarantee only the
availability of inter-service communication with traditional
resilience measures, but strict determinism should also be
maintained. Thus, the time-sensitive nature of the embedded
IoT services additionally complicates the resilient design.
Spare resources and dimensioning. Various proactive
measures require extensive resource planning since a network
and its nodes should guarantee sufficient resources to be
able to maintain the service availability in case of failures.
For instance, to enable service and traffic migrations [3],
or add redundant resource e.g., hot-backups, such planning
is vital. Further strategic choices, e.g., spatial placement of
redundant instances to encourage local repairs, also need a
careful organization. The complexity of planning spare re-
sources and network dimensioning significantly increases even
for small-sized networks under simple resilience constraints
like fault-tolerance against only single node failures. However,
optimum resource planning considering further failure and
attack scenarios is a more challenging problem.
Heterogeneity of service characteristics. The heterogene-
ity in service characteristics straitens design choices. While
some services need to be distributed over the network via
multiple instances, others have a few instances if not only
one. If resources are spare, e.g., as a result of an attack or
fault, mission-critical services should have a higher priority in
occupying network resources, while others should be served
on a best-effort basis only. Even the subsystems of highly
mission-critical systems such e.g., parts of an aircraft, have
separate and well-defined resilience requirements. As a result,
an increasing heterogeneity in service characteristics adds
extra design parameters and complicates the resilient system
design.
Shaping a fault-hypothesis. Mission-critical networks
should have the utmost resilience against any sort of threat to
avoid catastrophic consequences. There may be mass failures
due to software crashes, power cuts, or accidents. Cyber-
attacks can be targetted to specific hardware or software com-
ponents, and turn to be epidemics affecting a multitude of net-
work elements. Fault-hypothesis is the assumption concerning
the types, risks, and number of faults that a system is expected
to withstand. In the design phase, the fault-hypothesis should
be well-defined and the tradeoff between QoS-optimality, cost,
e.g., for redundancy, design, and implementation time, and
resilience should be considered. Moreover, the hypothesis
should realize the difference between service resilience, e.g.,
availability of services, and network resilience i.e., availability
of network elements and nodes, and guarantee the maintenance
of the former.
III. ISSUES OF REACTIVE MEASURES
Proactive measures enable a networked system to react
when an error occurs due to a failure or attack. We also need
reactive measures to detect and mitigate failures, and monitor
the status of the services via resilience mechanisms such
as Monitoring and Control Systems (MaCSs). The required
characteristics of MaCS to satisfy requirements of embedded
IoT networks are discussed in this section.
Time-sensitive detection. Apart from missing an error or
attack, even a slightly delayed detection may be disruptive
for time-sensitive services. Any disrupting attack or failure
should be detected and the required countermeasure should be
applied as early as possible right after the detection. Therefore,
we need more intelligent e.g., high-precision and predictive,
detection and mitigation algorithms, and proper MaCS archi-
tecture, e.g., encouraging quick and local mitigation/failover
to maintain inter-service deterministic communication.
Fault forecasting. Fault forecasting helps to predict a
possible failure in advance, especially for the systems whose
general behavior is well-defined. Mission-critical systems have
been usually isolated via strict access control schemes and thus
anomalies have been observable with strong indicators. How-
ever, modern embedded IoT systems are highly heterogeneous
and connected ecosystems with mixed safety-critical and non-
safety-critical services. Therefore, a more tedious and holistic
behavioral analysis is required on service behavior and inter-
service relationships for accurate forecasting.
Noncentralized architecture. A centralized MaCS may
provide a network-wide view and higher precision in detecting
failures. However, it has scalability issues and may have a
single point of failure depending on the failure scenarios.
Moreover, a centralized MaCS suffers from additional com-
munication delays, while a local and decentralized MaCS
could detect and react upon failures and attacks close to
their origin and promote quick failovers. When we consider
the failure tolerance of safety-critical systems from the order
of milliseconds to nanoseconds, a proper architecture that
minimizes the detection and mitigation delay is required.
Consensus and synchronization. Even if noncentralized
architectures are promising to address the time-sensitivity, it
brings some complexities such as consensus and synchroniza-
tion between MaCS instances. A distributed MaCS promotes
local provisioning and repairs, but still a consensus is required
to ensure the overall operating state of the network after
any change e.g., service migration. Moreover, the cooperation
between MaCS may be required to make globally optimal
decisions where a local decision may not be sufficient or
feasible. For instance, they should ensure the end-to-end traffic
is established within a bounded delay even if they are not
directly responsible for route finding. Most importantly, the
definition and prioritization of the cases that require consensus
in real-time or long-term are crucial to implement a consensus
and synchronization scheme.
IV. CONCLUSION
Embedded IoT networks constitute various modern safety-
critical systems. Their resilience against attacks and failures
should be prior design concerns to avoid the loss of life and
property. In this paper, we discuss the main issues of a resilient
embedded IoT network design under two categories, the issues
for proactive and reactive resilience measures to envision
further research questions. In those categories, we summarize
the important points to increase the robustness of the system
by design without sacrificing QoS and resilience via the design
of monitoring and controlling instruments, respectively.
REFERENCES
[1] C.-S. Shih, J.-J. Chou, and K.-J. Lin, “WuKong: Secure Run-Time
environment and data-driven IoT applications for Smart Cities and Smart
Buildings,” tech. rep.
[2] J. Rak, Resilient Routing in Communication Networks (Springer). 11
2015.
[3] K. Ogawa, H. Sekine, K. Kanai, K. Nakamura, H. Kanemitsu, J. Katto,
and H. Nakazato, “Performance evaluations of iot device virtualization
for efficient resource utilization,” in 2019 Global IoT Summit (GIoTS),
pp. 1–6, June 2019.
